










Parliament and national security
Russell Trood and Anthony Bergin
Executive summary
At a time when the challenges to Australia’s national security, if not unprecedented, are at least of a magnitude not 
experienced for a generation, when public confidence in the capacity of our politicians and the institutions of our 
government to deliver effective solutions to those challenges needs to be greatest, there’s good reason to ensure that 
the Australian Parliament plays a strong and vigorous role in providing the robust checks and balances necessary for the 
health of our parliamentary democracy.
Enhancing parliament’s role in national security would reinforce Executive accountability, expand public access to policy 
processes, improve the quality of public debate about national security and strengthen our democratic foundations.
If they wish to do so, parliamentarians can move the needle in the direction of change to improve and strengthen the 
management of our national security policy in an era of growing complexity, challenge and change. 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop speaks during House of Representatives question time at Parliament House in Canberra, 4 March 2015. (AAP Image/Lukas Coch)
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Seven measures would improve parliament’s role in the conduct of national security, without significantly affecting 
the Executive’s authority.
First, enhance respect for parliament by using its existing procedures to more fully consider and debate issues of 
foreign affairs, defence, intelligence and border security.
Second, develop parliamentarians’ education in national security by providing a new members’ orientation 
program focused on national security; running an enhanced program of regular informal briefings to 
parliamentarians by senior public servants; providing site inspections by specific national security agencies; and 
creating a cross-party parliamentary friendship group dedicated to improving understanding of Australia’s national 
security policy. 
Third, examine parliament’s exercise of war powers. Despite the sometimes intense nature of this debate, the 
parliament has yet to conduct a thorough investigation into the desirability of Australia extending some measure of 
authority to parliament over the overseas deployment of the ADF. 
Fourth, encourage parliamentary diplomacy. Our parliamentarians are an underused resource in Australia’s 
foreign relations. At a time when the nation’s overseas diplomatic footprint is proportionally the lowest of any 
OECD country, we could make better use of them to enhance our international presence, such as through their 
participation in international negotiations, attendance at diplomatic conferences, membership of delegations and 
roles in special missions for which they have unique knowledge or experience.
Fifth, review parliamentary committees’ resources. Improving parliament’s role requires increased human and 
financial resources for key national security committees. This should include considering the feasibility of seconding 
national security experts to committees for particular inquiries and references. 
Sixth, take steps to enhance the potential impact of committees’ reports by having the presiding officers of 
parliament (the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives) establish a program 
to train chairs and potential chairs of parliamentary committees, including by developing skills in report writing. 
Emphasise the different forms of reports, ways to convey clear policy messages, and writing and editing to ensure 
accessibility for readers. 
Finally, examine the mandates and work habits of each of the key national security committees to ensure that their 
work remains relevant to the changing demands of Australian society and the development of sound public policy.
Each of the existing parliamentary committees in the area of national security needs some degree of reform, 
particularly in intelligence oversight.
Seven measures would improve parliament’s role in the 




Nearly 40 years ago, one political scientist came to a rather pessimistic conclusion about the Australian Parliament’s role in foreign 
policy: ‘Not only is its influence over policy making extremely limited but its discharge of the functions of policy scrutiny and public 
education is gravely deficient.’1 
A few years later, in one of the few extended studies of parliament’s role in foreign affairs, Knight and Hudson noted that any 
discussion of the subject could ‘well seem at first sight an exercise in the obscure and the futile’.2 
And 12 years ago, in their study on the making of Australian foreign policy, Allan Gyngell and Michael Wesley expressed similarly 
pessimistic views about the work of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade on policy processes and 
of the parliament in general in relation to foreign policy formulation.3
However, the landscape isn’t entirely bleak. While progress has been more evolutionary than revolutionary, parliamentarians, 
at times with the cooperation of the government of the day, have demonstrated greater enthusiasm for extending parliament’s 
influence in the realm of foreign affairs and national security.
There’s now an increasingly lively debate about the further extension of parliament’s role. It perhaps reflects the logic of a view 
expressed in a Senate committee report over a decade ago:
[As] foreign policy considerations become increasingly important features of Australia’s political and economic landscape, and 
as the domains of international and domestic law-making become increasingly enmeshed, it is vital that Australia’s national 
parliament engages more fully in foreign and trade policy development.4
This ASPI Strategic Insights seeks to contribute to this debate as it relates to national security, which is here defined broadly as that 
area of public policy covering Australia’s foreign relations, defence, intelligence capacity and relevant facets of counterterrorism, 
immigration and border protection. It reviews existing processes and mechanisms relating to parliament’s engagement in national 
security and explores areas for reform, particularly of the parliamentary committee system (see box).
In preparing this paper, the authors interviewed members of parliament, senators, officials from Australian Government agencies 
and the staff of various parliamentary committees, who spoke to us on the basis of anonymity.
The core message in this Strategic Insights is that enhancing parliament’s role would reinforce Executive accountability, expand 
public access to policy processes, improve the quality of public debate about national security and help to strengthen the 
foundations of Australia’s parliamentary democracy.
National security and the parliamentary landscape
A casual observer could be easily forgiven for thinking that the Australian Parliament has the power to formulate and implement 
Australia’s national security policy. Our Constitution makes numerous references to the capacity of parliament to act in relation to 
matters such as external (foreign) affairs, defence and immigration, among other areas of responsibility.
But a literal reading of the Constitution is misleading. By custom and constitutional convention under our Westminster system of 
government, the power to make and implement Australia’s national security policy is firmly in the hands of the Executive branch 
of government. 
For over a century, successive Australian governments of all political persuasions have jealously protected that power. In 1950, 
Percy Spender, as the Minister for External Affairs in an early Menzies government and a distinguished lawyer, was unambiguous 
when he remarked that foreign policy ‘is and must remain the responsibility of the Executive’.5 He wasn’t the first to make 
that assertion.
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Parliamentary committees with responsibilities in relation to national security
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) considers and reports on such matters 
relating to foreign affairs, defence, trade and human rights as may be referred to it by either house of parliament, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister for Defence or the Minister for Trade. The JSCFADT may inquire into matters 
raised in annual reports of relevant departments and authorities or in reports of the Commonwealth Auditor-General. 
It consists of four subcommittees: Foreign Affairs and Aid; Defence; Trade; and Human Rights.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
The Intelligence Services Act 2001 requires the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) 
to review the administration and expenditure of the organisations that make up Australia’s intelligence community: 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Office of National 
Assessments, the Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Imagery and Geospatial Organisation 
and the Australian Signals Directorate. The PJCIS reviews any matter relating to those organisations that’s referred to it 
by the responsible minister or by a resolution of either house of parliament.
Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) inquires into and reports on matters arising from treaties and 
proposed treaty actions, and on any question relating to a treaty referred to it by either house of parliament or by a 
minister. The JSCOT may also inquire into and report on other matters referred to it by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
on conditions prescribed by the minister.
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
The Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (FADT) is one of eight pairs of standing committees that 
include a references committee and a legislation committee in discrete subject areas. The FADT legislation committee 
may inquire into and report on bills, estimates of expenditure and the annual reports and performance of relevant 
departments and agencies. The FADT references committee may inquire into and report on matters referred to it by the 
Senate, other than those to be referred to the legislation committee. 
Much of the explanation can be found in Australia’s inheritance of the conventions of the Westminster system of responsible 
parliamentary government, particularly the ‘royal prerogative’ in relation to foreign affairs,6 which includes the power to recognise 
states, accredit diplomats and ratify treaties. Over time, that power passed to the ministers (the cabinet) in the British system, and 
that arrangement was later accepted as part of our constitutional arrangements.
Executive authority in relation to foreign affairs and, by extension, to national security is reinforced by several other critical factors, 
such as:
• the unique nature of this area of public policy
• the challenges in managing a complex and fast moving international agenda
• the demand for confidentiality in the conduct of relations between states
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• the ability of national governments to draw on the vast resources of key agencies of state to design and implement policy 
decisions
• the reality that most citizens see national security issues as far removed from their day-to-day concerns and as so complicated 
that they are best left to experts. 
History and convention aside, the dynamics of parliamentary involvement in national security continue to be shaped by three 
powerful realities of Australian political life.7
First, the authority of the Prime Minister in relation to national security has grown and continues to do so. This tendency was 
noticed as far back as the Whitlam and Fraser governments but gained momentum during the Howard and Rudd governments; it 
shows few signs of declining in the Abbott government. For managing a coherent national security policy, this might or might not 
be desirable, but it can easily suck oxygen out of an open policy process, limiting other parliamentary voices and, on occasions, 
other ministerial voices. 
Second, there’s a growing imperative in all political parties to achieve and enforce party discipline: all maintain that ‘disunity 
is death’. While this undoubtedly has considerable logic in the modern Westminster system, if it’s overused or applied too 
strongly it constrains members’ and senators’ independence of action and weakens the capacity of opposition and backbench 
parliamentarians to hold the Executive arm of government to account. 
Third, parliament is generally ill-served by the limited knowledge and experience of national security issues that members 
and senators bring to their parliamentary duties. In the 44th parliament (Figure 1), few parliamentarians come to office with an 
extensive academic or practical understanding of foreign affairs, defence or intelligence questions.
Figure 1:  Expertise on national security among the members of the 44th Australian Parliament
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Compared to lawyers, union officials or teachers elected to parliament, people with defence force or international relations 
expertise have always been in a noticeable minority.
Nor is there much incentive to increase one’s knowledge or expertise once elected. While there are clearly exceptions, few 
parliamentarians see their electoral future as having much to do with mastering the sometimes byzantine world of national 
security policy. Nor will a well-earned reputation for critical thinking in this arena necessarily impress party leaders and improve 
prospects for promotion. 
As things stand, ambitious parliamentarians are better off trying to impress their constituents with the depth of their knowledge 
of the complexities of social security entitlements, the environment or even the more arcane parts of income tax law than with a 
profound understanding of contemporary global affairs. 
Perhaps parliamentarians can be forgiven for these rather utilitarian calculations of their career interests. In many different ways, 
modern parliamentary ritual, heavily partisan as it has become, often seems able to diminish the importance of national security; 
it often encourages political point scoring and partisanship, rather than clear and independent thought or careful critical analysis 
of often complicated and challenging issues.
Perhaps a political fear that parliament might find its critical voice has led to the observable decline in ministerial statements and 
parliamentary debates on national security, both of which are now few and far between. Whatever the reason, this has been a clear 
trend over time and over a succession of governments. 
No less egregious in its disrespect for the institution is ministers’ inclination to announce key policy changes to the media outside 
parliament, rather than to colleagues within it. For example, Prime Minister Gillard released the 2013 Defence White Paper in the 
belly of a C130 Hercules aircraft parked on the apron at Fairbairn airbase; more recently, Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced 
important new counterterrorism measures at the Australian Federal Police headquarters. Media opportunities such as these are 
the life-blood of modern political life, but their impact on respect for parliament as an institution shouldn’t be underestimated. 
Despite these trends, parliament’s processes and procedures continue to offer many opportunities to ventilate national security 
issues and, theoretically, strengthen the ability of backbenchers who want to develop their interests in national security policy.
In both chambers of the Australian Parliament, members can contribute to legislative, adjournment, grievance and 
address-in-reply debates and can contribute to committee reports. Responses to (sadly) all too rare ministerial statements, 
periodic notices of motion and the daily ritual of question time present further opportunities to raise issues.
The parliamentary committee system is more promising for members seeking a more profound engagement on national security 
issues. For those matters, the system extends to four key committees: the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade; the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security; the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties; and the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee. Other committees are more marginally engaged. 
As things stand, ambitious parliamentarians are better off trying 
to impress their constituents with the depth of their knowledge of 
the complexities of social security entitlements, the environment or 
even the more arcane parts of income tax law than with a profound 
understanding of contemporary global affairs.  
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In this system, partisanship often seems to be forgotten, or at least put to one side (albeit temporarily), as senators and members 
summon their better angels to focus on the national interest and reach policy positions through consensus and agreement. 
But in the more ritualised arena of the parliamentary chambers, politics often rules as well-trodden policy paths are reiterated, 
set-piece rhetorical exchanges are commonplace, entrenched party positions and ideological convictions are reinforced and 
perceived weaknesses and failures of policy, usually by governments, are identified and usually magnified. 
The perspective of eminent Australian political scientist and scholar of international relations, TB Millar, may be some decades old, 
but at times it still rings true:
The national torture to which parliament submits members of the public unwary or dedicated enough to tune into the 
compulsory broadcast of its proceedings is nowhere more painful than in the debates on foreign affairs and defence. Rarely is 
there a clash of intelligent and informed debate.8
While there are many historical and systemic reasons for the marginalisation of parliament on national security matters, like some 
other national institutions it’s the victim of the 24/7 media cycle. The voracious media require constant feeding and sustenance but 
usually and rather perversely take little more than a perfunctory interest in national security. There are exceptions, of course, such 
as the attention now being given to ISIL and the threat of Islam-inspired terrorism here and abroad. The situation isn’t helped by 
the infrequency with which parliament meets—an average of only 18 weeks a year in recent years. 
However it’s to be explained, parliament’s limited stature and role in the conduct of national security policy is hardly a recipe for 
good governance. There’s considerable room for reform. 
At a time when the challenges to Australia’s national security, if not unprecedented, are at least of a magnitude not experienced for 
a generation, when public confidence in the capacity of our politicians and the institutions of our government to deliver effective 
solutions to those challenges needs to be greatest, there’s good reason to ensure that the Australian Parliament plays a strong and 
vigorous role in providing the robust checks and balances necessary for the health of our parliamentary democracy.
As a recent paper by former New South Wales Labor senator John Faulkner argues, the case for expanded parliamentary 
oversight and the protection of individuals’ rights and liberties becomes stronger at a time when successive governments have 
provided Australian intelligence and national security agencies with increasingly intrusive powers to act against domestic and 
international terrorism.
While a balance needs to be struck between security imperatives and citizens’ rights, the idea that ‘enhanced powers demand 
enhanced safeguards’9 is not only a sound principle of parliamentary accountability and the oversight of Executive power; it also 
underscores a basic principle of parliamentary democracy—the right of the citizens to be protected against excessive intrusions by 
the state on their rights, freedoms and liberties. 
But the case for enhancing the role of parliament, and especially its committees, in relation to national security doesn’t just 
depend on the need for oversight and accountability.
The responsibility to enact the legislative agenda of the government of the day is of course parliament’s inescapable burden. 
Beyond that, however, lies the opportunity for parliament to set the agenda for new issues of public policy, to be a mechanism 
to aggregate disparate electoral interests and build consensus on necessary policy reforms, and to deepen and improve public 
knowledge and understanding of especially complicated or complex policy challenges. All are important parliamentary tasks and 
ought to be encouraged. 
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Conducting business
Most of these parliamentary functions and processes could be improved significantly by some measured changes to general 
parliamentary procedures and by some carefully calibrated reforms to the way parliamentary committees conduct their affairs in 
the arena of national security. 
Parliamentary procedures are a function of the standing orders of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Contrary to 
common belief, the two chambers’ standing orders are quite different, reflecting their different constitutional roles, electoral 
make-up and, perhaps most significantly, distinctive institutional cultures. A vivid and significant example of those differences can 
be seen in the Senate’s now well-established practice of Estimates committees—a process for examining a government’s plans for 
public expenditure that takes place three times a year. This is a practice unknown in the House.
The effectiveness of standing orders in organising and managing parliament’s business depends on the way they are interpreted 
by the two chambers’ presiding officers (the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House) and the way each bends to or 
accommodates the will of the chamber. 
In the House, this usually means adjusting to the political priorities of the government of the day, while in the Senate it’s a more 
complex task, depending on the political make-up of the chamber. However they may be written, the standing orders of the two 
chambers are animated through the way they are interpreted, and that’s generally a political, even highly partisan, process. In 
the House, the process responds to the government’s political agenda; in the Senate, it responds to the interests of a coalition 
comprising a majority of senators, however it might be formed. 
It follows that reforming the way parliament conducts its business isn’t merely a matter of changing the standing orders but 
demands changes to the standing orders of both houses independently. In each case, this is almost always a highly political 
activity, often engaging the perceived partisan interests of the major players, whether they are parties or, particularly in the 
Senate, individuals. This often makes change difficult for even the most dedicated reformer. 
Seven measures to strengthen the role of parliament in national security 
For reasons noted above, particularly the power of the Executive, reforming the way parliament approaches national security is 
especially challenging. However, some general reforms would materially improve parliament’s role in the national security area 
without significantly affecting the Executive’s authority.
These changes would help to reinforce the fundamental constitutional principle in Australia that we operate under a Westminster 
system in which the Executive is of the parliament, not removed or separate from it. 
1: Respect parliament as the forum for consideration of national security issues
Governments of the day should reinvest in respect for parliament as an institution. This could be achieved in any number of ways, 
from ensuring that the parliament sits more often to significantly reforming question time.
However, from a national security perspective, using the parliament’s existing procedures to more fully consider and debate 
foreign affairs, defence, intelligence and border security, among other matters, would reinforce the standing of parliament while 
also giving parliamentarians the opportunity to contribute to policy thinking. 
... some general reforms would materially improve parliament’s 
role in the national security area without significantly affecting the 
Executive’s authority.
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For many years, governments have been inclined to bypass the parliament when dealing with security issues. In part, this has been 
a function of rapid changes in the way parliament engages with the media, but more than anything else it has suited the political 
imperatives of successive governments—not necessarily the cause of good public policy. 
Australian governments now and in the future should commit themselves to ensuring that the Australian Parliament is the 
primary national institution for discussing and debating the nation’s national security policy. To that end, they should ensure 
that parliament is the forum for pronouncements on all key national security policy decisions and that it’s provided with regular 
opportunities to discuss, consider and debate policy issues. 
2: Develop parliamentarians’ education in national security
Australian parliamentarians in general are poorly educated and informed on national security. Over time, drawing them into more 
regular engagement in this area would enhance their knowledge and understanding of the key security challenges and dilemmas 
facing the nation.
The international security environment is challenging and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future, so good national 
security policy choices call for better educated parliamentarians.
This isn’t merely a sound parliamentary ideal. During research for this study, senior public servants in key national security 
agencies consistently lamented the absence of a better informed parliament to more fully and critically assess policy decisions 
and choices.
Far from believing that parliamentary ignorance is a virtue that makes their task as public servants more straightforward, most 
senior national security officials said that they’d prefer to know that our representatives clearly understand the defence and 
security challenges we face as a country. They’d welcome constructive and more informed parliamentary contributions to the 
national security policy conversation.
The responsible parliamentary officers and, perhaps most importantly, the chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees 
should seriously consider ways to improve senators’ and members’ knowledge and understanding of national security issues.
This could include providing a new members’ orientation program focused on national security; an enhanced program of regular 
informal briefings to parliamentarians by senior public servants; site inspections of specific national security agencies; and the 
creation of a cross-party parliamentary friendship group dedicated to improving knowledge and understanding of Australia’s 
national security policy through seminars, lectures and briefings by experts in the field. 
3: Examine parliament’s exercise of war powers
In recent years, there have been more and stronger calls for the Australian Parliament to have a greater role in decisions by the 
government of the day to deploy military forces overseas. Ideas about the appropriate extent of the parliament’s role vary. Some 
suggest that parliament should be responsible for declaring war, while others would limit its role to consultation.
Either way, these ideas involve a significant extension of parliament’s power, which has traditionally not extended to this area of 
policy because that would involve a derogation of Executive prerogative. Yet, in other countries, notably the US and more recently 
the UK, legislatures have had these powers in some form. 
The authors are cautious on this matter and aren’t persuaded that the extension of ‘war powers’ to the Australian Parliament 
would materially improve the development of public policy in Australia.10 Governments are elected to govern, and that authority 
extends to making difficult decisions about the appropriate use of military force. Other salient factors are the need for timeliness in 
decision-making, the unique knowledge that governments possess about often complex foreign affairs issues and the challenges 
in securing an appropriate resolution from a possibly fractious legislature.
However, there’s opinion in the other direction, including from no less than a former Coalition prime minister, Malcolm Fraser.11 
Despite the sometimes intense nature of this debate, the parliament has yet to conduct a thorough investigation of the matter. 
... some general reforms would materially improve parliament’s 
role in the national security area without significantly affecting the 
Executive’s authority.
10 Creative tension: Parliament and national security
The Defence subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade should consider inquiring into the 
desirability of Australia extending some measure of authority to parliament over the overseas deployment of the ADF. 
4: Develop parliamentary diplomacy
Many of Australia’s 226 parliamentarians regularly engage with government officials and fellow parliamentarians from other 
countries. Their contacts are through parliamentary friendship groups, visiting delegations, overseas visits to other parliaments 
and such international organisations as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. 
Overall, however, Australia’s parliamentarians are a rather underused resource in our foreign relations. At a time when the nation’s 
overseas diplomatic footprint is proportionally the lowest of any OECD country,12 there’s room for some creative thinking to 
identify opportunities to make better use of interested and able parliamentarians to enhance our international presence.
One useful measure would be to expand the structured and focused outgoing parliamentary delegations programs (see box).
 
Committee visits
Excluding ad hoc delegations, three committee visits feature in the Australian Parliament’s outgoing delegation 
program each year: an Asia committee visit, a committee visit to New Zealand and the Pacific, and a committee visit 
to China.
Each of the visits rotates between House of Representatives, Senate and joint committees. The presiding officers make 
the decision based on bids from eligible committees outlining how the committee’s current work program would 
benefit from the proposed visit. 
The rotation is ‘staggered’ so that all parliamentary committees are eligible to bid for one of the committee visits each 
year. Many committees find the visits a valuable tool to broaden the scope of their inquiries.
An Asia–Pacific committee visit was introduced to the outgoing delegations program in 2009 to enable parliamentary 
committees to explore relevant issues with neighbouring countries and to build further parliamentary links with Asia 
and the Pacific.
From 2014, the Asia–Pacific committee visit was modified to focus on just the Asia region (the successful committee 
visits two Asian countries each year), while the Pacific component was added to the New Zealand committee exchange.
The intention was to increase engagement with Asia and build stronger relationships between parliamentary 
committees and their counterparts in the region.
The visit is open to all parts of Asia, including parts of the Middle East and Western Asia. In 2015, this visit will be by a 
House of Representatives committee.
The New Zealand committee exchange has been part of the outgoing delegations program for many years, recognising 
the special relationship between Australia and New Zealand. Under the exchange, a New Zealand parliamentary 
committee also visits Australia each year.
In 2014, the outgoing New Zealand committee exchange visit was modified to become an annual committee visit 
to New Zealand and one Pacific region country (excluding the US, which is already included as part of the outgoing 
delegations program for each term of parliament). In 2015, this visit will be by a joint committee.
The China committee visit is an annual commitment under the terms of a memorandum of understanding between the 
Australian Parliament and China’s National People’s Congress, under which a delegation from China also visits Australia 
each year. In 2015, this visit will be by a Senate committee.
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In conjunction with the relevant parliamentary committees, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and her department should consider 
ways in which members of parliament might make useful contributions to the conduct of Australia’s international diplomacy, 
such as through parliamentary participation in international negotiations, attendance at diplomatic conferences, membership of 
delegations and participation in special missions for which a senator or member has unique knowledge or experience.
5: Review parliamentary committees’ resources
A material improvement in parliament’s role in national security issues requires increased human and financial resources for key 
committees. 
In line with general budgetary restraint, the resources allocation to the functions of parliament has eroded steadily over recent 
years. The financial resources available to committees have suffered: overall allocations to the House and Senate declined from 
$18.2 million in 2009–10 to $15.5 million in 2013–14.13
This has had an impact on the length of committee inquiries, the employment of staff, the ability to have witnesses attend hearings 
and the capacity of members to undertake inquiry-related travel, among other things. 
The allocation of resources for committees is in the hands of each of the houses. The Department of the Senate and the 
Department of the House of Representatives allocate funds from their budgets for their committee offices. For joint committees, 
the responsibility rests with the department that administers the committee.
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) representatives in Africa as part of its inquiry into Australia’s relationship with the countries of Africa, March 2011.
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The allocation of resources for committees raises two broad issues: the number of available staff and the extent of their specialist 
knowledge and expertise. The number of Senate committee staff numbers has declined in recent years, and there’s been only a 
modest increase in House committee staff.14 
Some relief from this pressure can be provided by using the central research services available to all parliamentarians through the 
Parliamentary Library, particularly the expertise available in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security section. While the library 
provides excellent services, over recent years it has suffered a steady erosion of its resources, and hence its capabilities.
In general, the committee staff are ‘making do’, but they are consistently under pressure from the heavy workloads of the 
committees. They are enduring long and demanding hours, often to meet tight deadlines, to support their committee’s activities. 
The challenges are compounded in the area of national security, as it’s now a well-established practice to rotate committee 
staff, who are generalists, among the various committees of the parliament. Despite the high levels of professionalism among 
committee staff, these arrangements can undermine the effectiveness of committees, depriving them of staff continuity and 
experience and high levels of subject expertise. 
To deal with the challenges in committee resourcing, the Senate and the House should each review the staffing and resourcing of 
its committees. In the Senate, several ‘domestic’ committees dealing with matters relating to the internal operations of the Senate 
may be suited to undertaking such a review. The House’s counterpart domestic committees could conduct a similar review for 
House committees. Alternatively, the presiding officers could consider initiating an appropriate form of review.
These reviews should examine, in particular, the extent to which greater budgetary constraint has affected the provision of staff to 
parliamentary committees with responsibilities in the area of national security. 
They should also consider staff’s expertise and the continuity of staff’s committee assignments and explore ways to ensure that 
both are maximised. They should examine the feasibility of seconding national security experts to committees for particular 
committee inquiries and references. 
The chairs of the key national security committees should explore the possibility of making secondments to their committees from 
among personnel in the national security agencies. Secondments would not only increase committees’ human resources and build 
staff’s expertise, but would help to improve secondees’ knowledge and understanding of the working of parliament and the role it 
plays in the administration and oversight of Australia’s national security policy. 
6: Enhance the potential impact of committees’ reports
The nature and structure of the reports of parliament’s committees, including those in relation to national security, are a function 
of many things: the composition of the committee, an inquiry’s terms of reference, the political sensitivities of references, the 
evidence tendered to the committee and the competence of its chair.
Often, a committee secretary will take on the task of drafting a report along lines suggested by the chair. This work is usually done 
with great professionalism, but using a rather formulaic template. According to some people interviewed for this report, this often 
leads to reports that are too long and ponderous and that lack a clear policy direction. 
Sometimes, the messages in committee reports are mixed. For example, a recent Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee report on firearms was significantly split: there were widely diverging views between the chair’s (Labor) 
section and a section by the majority of members (Liberals, Nationals and Senator Leyonhjelm).15 Similarly, a report by that 
committee on telecommunications interception had a chair’s report, remarks from government senators and comments from 
opposition senators.16
It isn’t always possible to keep politics out of committee reports, but unanimous reports tend to carry greater weight. Either way, 
as research for this paper revealed, parliamentary reports in the areas of foreign affairs, defence and national security aren’t 
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always given the attention within government agencies that they deserve or that the committees expect. One reason for this is that 
they are rarely presented in ways that are readily digestible by busy public servants.
Committee chairs can change this by carefully considering the way their reports are structured and presented, but the pressure of 
time, other responsibilities and lack of experience, and even want of interest, often combine to discourage different approaches. 
Given that committee chairs come to their roles with relatively little experience, a program to enhance their skills would be a useful 
investment in building parliamentary capacity.
In conjunction with party whips, the presiding officers of the parliament should establish a program of training for chairs and 
potential chairs of parliamentary committees. In addition to focusing on committee procedure and the art of good chairmanship, 
the program should include the development of skills in report writing, with an emphasis on different forms of reports, conveying 
clear policy messages and ensuring accessibility for readers. 
7: Examine committee mandates
One key factor in ensuring the integrity of the committee system is the need to ensure that the committees’ work remains relevant 
to the changing demands of Australian society and the development of sound public policy. The committees of the Australian 
Parliament tend to be rather conservative in this regard.
The committees are more deferential to ministerial preferences and place a higher premium on secrecy than is the case in some 
other parliamentary systems, not least the system at Westminster in London. Change is needed if the committee system is to 
remain relevant to the demands of a modern parliamentary democracy. Each of the existing parliamentary committees relevant to 
national security needs some reform. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) has struggled with the fact that international instruments arrive on its 
agenda only after they’ve been negotiated by governments, often through a protracted process. 
Inserted into the parliamentary process between signature and ratification, the instruments are virtually impossible to amend, 
regardless of any judgement the committee might form about their merit. This doesn’t negate the value of the committee process, 
but it does challenge the overall effectiveness of the process.17 
One obvious way to overcome this problem would be to have JSCOT scrutinise instruments before they are signed, but that would 
involve a radical departure from a traditional prerogative of the Executive government. 
A less intrusive approach would be to give members of the committee access to the negotiations for treaties and agreements 
before they are concluded. This could occur through a confidential briefing of the committee or perhaps by including key 
committee members in negotiating delegations.
JSCOT should inquire into ways its members might gain insight into the progress of treaty negotiations before the treaty is 
concluded and signed. The inquiry could consider encouraging treaty negotiators to provide JSCOT with regular updates on the 
progress of treaty negotiation, including committee members in negotiating delegations, or both. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) is the longest standing and arguably the most 
prestigious national security committee of the parliament. It has a wide remit. Together with the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence 
...ensure that the committees’ work remains relevant to the changing 
demands of Australian society and the development of sound 
public policy.
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and Trade Committee, it assumes much of the parliament’s burden of investigation and oversight in foreign affairs and defence. 
The government of the day has a majority of the members of the committee.
Over time, some of JSCFADT’s inquiries have resulted in influential reports valued by governments, but at other times it has 
struggled to make an impact. On the other hand, its series of regular briefings by distinguished academic, diplomatic and 
government personnel help to inform committee members of key trends and developments in international relations, and is 
widely regarded as a very valuable part of its work. 
JSCFADT’s mandate and structure have changed over time, but one element of its mandate has remained since its formation: the 
need for its inquiries to be approved by an appropriate minister (usually the Foreign Minister) or by resolution of one of the houses 
of parliament. 
This power of veto was used relatively recently to prevent the committee holding an inquiry on a matter of some substance. While 
the veto has been used only sparingly, it remains a constraint on the committee’s independence; it’s a vestige from a bygone era 
that compromises the committee’s capacity to make a potentially valuable contribution to policy debates in Australia. It should 
be removed.
Consideration might also be given to establishing the committee in a form similar to the Public Accounts Committee of the 
parliament, which is created under its own legislation. 
With or without such a radical reform, JSCFADT’s reputation would be enhanced, its members’ capacity to contribute to policy 
debates strengthened and its ability to exercise Executive oversight improved if it could develop a more structured workload and 
greater continuity in its program of activities and inquiries. 
The committee’s regular exercise of its power to inquire into the Defence Department’s annual report is something of a model 
that could be usefully extended to the annual report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The committee should take 
particular notice of the department’s foreign aid functions, which are substantial in budgetary terms but receive relatively little 
consistent parliamentary scrutiny. 
JSCFADT’s public education role would be enhanced if the already well-established practice of ministerial appearances before 
the committee for private briefings were extended to public briefings on matters of contemporary importance, such as events 
in Afghanistan or the Middle East. Alternatively, it might consider following the example of the House Economics Committee, 
before which the Governor of the Reserve Bank appears regularly. Although the heads of Australian Government departments 
aren’t statutory officers, as the Reserve Bank Governor is, inviting the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(presumably with ministerial approval) to provide a regular update to the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the state of Australia’s 
international relations would be a valuable exercise in public education, assisting both the committee and Australians more 
widely. A similar briefing might be provided to the Defence subcommittee by the Secretary of the Defence Department. 
As part of its responsibilities, JSCFADT could also investigate the contents of Defence or Foreign Affairs white papers. A good 
starting point would be the Abbott government’s forthcoming Defence White Paper.
...inviting the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(presumably with ministerial approval) to provide a regular update to 
the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the state of Australia’s international 
relations would be a valuable exercise.
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Secretary Ewen McDonald (left) and Secretary Peter Varghese appear before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade at 
Parliament House in Canberra, 3 June 2015. (AAP Image/Mick Tsikas)
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS), established in 2001, is the newest of the 
parliamentary committees dedicated to the oversight of national security matters. During the reforms to Australia’s 
counterterrorism legislation in recent years, it’s also been among the busiest, undertaking a series of valuable reviews of proposed 
legislative changes.
As noted above, the recent paper by a former senator (and member of the committee) John Faulkner very effectively brought 
together many themes relevant to PJCIS’s contemporary role and responsibilities. That paper made a series of recommendations 
about committee oversight and accountability, which the authors of this ASPI paper endorse. The recommendations relate to 
the membership of the committee, its role in the oversight of the counterterrorism functions of the Australian Federal Police, 
its capacity to generate its own inquiries, increased resources for the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, greater 
liaison between the committee and other oversight bodies, such as the Inspector-General and the Independent National Security 
Legislation Monitor, and a call for sunset clauses in controversial legislation. Faulkner also recommends extending PJCIS’ powers 
and access to certain classified documents. 
While those recommendations certainly deserve endorsement, there’s a legitimate question about whether they go far 
enough. In the UK, the Intelligence and Security Committee has a broadly similar role. Although that committee’s made up of 
parliamentarians, it isn’t a committee of the parliament: it reports to the Prime Minister, not the parliament. Nevertheless, it has 
a wider, more intrusive oversight mandate. In 2013, the committee’s powers were extended when its enabling legislation was 
amended to permit it to ‘examine or otherwise oversee the expenditure, administration, policy and operations’ (emphasis added) 
of the UK’s key intelligence agencies. This reform effectively provides the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee with powers of 
oversight broadly analogous to those of congressional intelligence oversight committees in the US. 
By comparison, the mandate of Australia’s PJCIS is severely constrained. It’s formally restricted to reviewing the administration 
and expenditure of Australia’s six intelligence agencies and specifically precluded from investigating a long list of matters, 
including operations.18
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The powers now vested in Australia’s intelligence agencies are greater than ever before, have recently been expanded yet again 
and can’t justifiably escape closer public oversight. Given that oversight traditions in the US are profoundly different from those 
in Australia, the American model can’t easily be recommended, but those in the UK emerge from a similar parliamentary tradition 
and are therefore worthy of close Australian scrutiny. To that end, this report supports Faulkner’s call for the government to 
commission a comprehensive public review of the oversight of Australia’s intelligence agencies. The inquiry should pay attention 
to intelligence oversight regimes in other countries, particularly the US and the UK, and should examine the impact of the recent 
changes to the powers of the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee.
The Senate’s committee system is a fundamentally important element of the work it undertakes as a house of review. In the area 
of national security, the Senate’s role is reflected in the work of several committees based on their specifically assigned portfolio 
responsibilities. Leaving aside the joint committees it shares with the House of Representatives, over the past 40 years the Senate 
has developed an elaborate committee system of its own, covering all aspects of government administration. 
In relation to national security, the key committee is the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee (FADT), although 
some agencies, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, come under the 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee. Like other Senate committees, FADT has both a legislative and a references identity, 
depending on the functions being performed at the time of its sitting. The power of Senate references committees to initiate 
inquiries is constrained: inquiries are referred to them from the Senate.
Sitting as a legislative committee, FADT scrutinises any legislation referred to it. Three times a year, it sits as a Senate estimates 
committee to examine proposed government expenditure (in essence, the budget). Estimates hearings can sometimes be torrid 
affairs for the public servants who appear before them, as the examination of budgetary items can be detailed and forensic. 
Perhaps for that reason, some of the public servants interviewed for this study were unflattering in their comments about the 
process and urged reform.
Generally, however, senators regard estimates hearings as an important part of the way parliament discharges its responsibility to 
ensure Executive accountability. Given that view, the likelihood of significant change in the process is very low. 
When sitting as a references committee, FADT has undertaken some of the most important inquiries by a parliamentary 
committee. Its inquiries have covered a wide range of issues, including in recent years military justice (2005), naval shipbuilding 
(2006), public diplomacy (2007), procurement procedures in Defence (2012), the Indian Ocean rim (2013) and Australia’s aid 
program (2014).
As with the Senate committee system more generally, the FADT references committee performs a valuable public service under 
some notable constraints, not the least of which is the relatively small size of the committee: it usually comprises only six senators, 
who have many other demands on their time, including work on other committees. 
Because FADT is an integral part of a much more comprehensive system of committees, its structural reform in isolation would 
be difficult, so the case for that reform isn’t compelling. Nevertheless, the committee’s effectiveness would be improved by two 
specific reforms. 
First, it would benefit from an increased allocation of resources, including the secondment of specialist advisers from national 
security agencies for the duration of specific inquiries.
...FADT references committee performs a valuable public service under 
some notable constraints, not the least of which is the relatively small 
size of the committee.
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Second, the committee could adopt a more structured approach to its work, inquiring into the most important areas of national 
security policy as a regular part of its remit. With six-year terms, senators are uniquely placed to take on this task. At the same 
time, this would give a clearer focus to the committee’s role, which is distinct from that of the joint committee, and enable greater 
attention to several areas of policy that for the most part escape parliament’s regular, systematic attention. 
One more obvious area of public policy in need of that attention is the foreign aid budget, which even after recent cutbacks is 
in the vicinity of $4 billion and for the most part largely removed from parliament’s regular scrutiny. A second area is capability 
planning within the Department of Defence, which has come to the committee’s attention in the past. It’s at least arguable that 
the shortcomings identified in the recently completed First Principles Review of Defence wouldn’t have become so serious if the 
parliament had benefited from more sustained monitoring and scrutiny of the department’s capability management.19 
Given that the government has accepted the recommendations of the First Principles Review, following up the implementation of 
the required reforms is an obvious task for FADT.
Beyond that responsibility, neither the review of official development assistance nor the regular scrutiny of defence capability 
development needs be an annual undertaking. However, if they were a regular part of FADT’s work cycle, and undertaken in 
conjunction with inquiries into other important matters of national security, such as strategic policy or national security planning, 
the committee would be able to develop a high level of expertise that would make its work a fundamentally important element 
of parliamentary accountability and oversight. At the same time, FADT sitting as a references committee should continue with its 
valuable work on selective inquiries. 
Concluding remarks
Since the end of World War II, the Australian Parliament’s engagement on national security policy has expanded as the nation’s 
international personality has evolved and changed. That engagement has always taken place within the constraints of our 
Westminster system of parliamentary governance, in which the Executive arm of government has remained dominant in the 
formulation and implementation of foreign and security policy. This is unlikely to change significantly in the foreseeable future. 
However, within those constraints, the role of the parliament as a forum for discussing national security, investigating new 
and significant policy challenges and overseeing Executive authority, particularly in relation to intelligence activities, has 
grown significantly.
That growth has been reflected in the steady but rather piecemeal expansion of the parliamentary committee system, which now 
covers all areas of national security policy. If anything, the process has been evolutionary, as parliament has rather carefully and 
cautiously tested its ability to press the boundaries of its role, sometimes against strong resistance from ministers.
Executive and ministerial resistance has often been cloaked in rhetoric about defending traditional ministerial prerogatives and 
the values of the Westminster system, but when change has occurred its  impact on those prerogatives and values has been 
limited and it hasn’t significantly degraded Executive authority. But reform has changed the institutional culture of the parliament. 
It has legitimised parliament’s role as an increasingly important partner of the Executive in the conduct of Australia’s national 
security policy. 
There’s undoubtedly room for further expansion of this role. Developments in the UK, where the responsibilities of the parliament’s 
Intelligence Oversight Committee have been expanded and debates on the floor of the House of Commons about overseas 
deployments of British forces are becoming more common, may be a pointer for change in Australia. 
Some significant past reforms of the Australian system have been the result of outside influences (such as the findings of the Hope 
royal commissions of 1970s and 1980s and the Flood review of 2004), but others have occurred at the initiative of the parliament. 
This is where the challenge of further reform must be accepted. 
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If they wish to do so, parliamentarians have the capacity to move the needle in the direction of change. As Martin Indyk noted in 
his study of the role of backbenchers during the 30th parliament nearly 40 years ago, ‘they were able to overcome obstacles to 
influence and were able to make their voices heard … through determined and adept use of the means at their disposal.’20 
Arguably, the task has become easier than it was then. Certainly, there’s a strong argument that change would not only enhance 
the role and the standing of the parliament as the representative institution at the heart of Australian democracy, but that it would 
also improve and strengthen the management of Australian national security policy in an era of growing complexity, challenge 
and change. 
Notes
1 Brian L Hocking, ‘Parliament, parliamentarians and foreign affairs’, Australian Outlook, August 1976, 30(2):302.
2 John Knight, WJ Hudson, ‘Parliament and foreign policy’, Canberra Studies in World Affairs, no. 13, Department of International 
Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1983, p. 1.
3 Alan Gyngell, Michael Wesley, Making Australian foreign policy, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 173–174.
4 The (not quite) white paper on Australia’s foreign affairs and trade policy, Advancing the national interest, Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee, December 2003, p. viii.
5 Quoted in Martin Indyk, Influence without power: the role of the backbench in Australian foreign policy, 1976–1977, Parliamentary 
Library, 1977, p. 5.
6 For a discussion, see Knight & Hudson, Ch. 3.
7 For a general discussion of the challenges, see Kate Burton, Scrutiny or secrecy: committee oversight of foreign and national 
security policy in the Australian Parliament, Department of Parliamentary Services, Parliament of Australia, November 2005.
8 Quoted in Martin Indyk, p. 30.
9 John Faulkner, Surveillance, intelligence and accountability: an Australian story, occasional paper, November 2014, p. 1.
10 Russell Trood, Anthony Bergin, ‘Parliamentary vote would dangerously restrict executive in war’, The Australian, 
2 September 2014.
11 Malcolm Fraser, Paul Barrett, ‘Going to war is a matter for parliament’, The Australian, 6 September 2014.
12  Australia’s diplomatic deficit: reinvesting in our instruments of international policy, Blue Ribbon Panel report, Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, March 2009.
13 Portfolio Budget Statements, 2014–15; Department of the House of Representatives and Department of the Senate, annual 
reports, 2013–14.
14 Between 2008–09 and 2013–14, Senate committee staff declined from 62 to 53. House committee staff grew from 61 to 65 
during the same period. See Senate and House annual reports. 
15  The ability of Australian law enforcement authorise to eliminate gun-related violence in the community, Senate Standing 
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, online. 
16  Comprehensive revision of Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs, online. 
17 For a discussion of these challenges, see Treaty scrutiny: a ten year review assessing the 1996 reforms in 2006, report 78, Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties, September 2006, pp. 31–36.
18  Intelligence Services Act 2001, especially Part 4.
19 The review noted that when addressing criticisms Defence, among other things, was inward looking, had a propensity for 
obfuscation, avoided fixing underlying problems, showed a willingness to ‘game the system to its advantage’ and lacked 
transparency. See First Principles Review: creating one Defence, Department of Defence, April 2015, p. 15. 
20 Martin Indyk, p. 49
19Strategic Insights
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADF Australian Defence Force
FADT Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee
JSCFADT Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
JSCOT Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PJCIS Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
Important disclaimer
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to the subject matter covered. It is provided with the 
understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contents 
of this publication without first obtaining advice from a qualified professional person.
About the authors
Russell Trood is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. Professor Trood 
was a Liberal senator for Queensland in the Australian Parliament, serving as Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade and as a member of the Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and the Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade, among other positions. In 2012, he completed an appointment as the Special Envoy of the Prime 
Minister of Australia for Eastern Europe.
Anthony Bergin is deputy director of ASPI. He worked as a foreign affairs analyst with the Legislative Research Service of the 
Australian Parliament and taught political science at the Royal Australian Naval College. He was a senior academic at the Australian 
Defence Force Academy, UNSW, for 20 years, where he served as the Director of the Australian Defence Studies Centre for 12 years.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank former ASPI intern Daniel Nichola for his research assistance in preparing this paper.
About Strategic Insights
Strategic Insights are shorter studies intended to provide expert perspectives on topical policy issues. They reflect the personal views of the author(s), 
and do not in any way express or reflect the views of the Australian Government or represent the formal position of ASPI on any particular issue.
ASPI
Tel +61 2 6270 5100






© The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2015
This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it may in any form or by any means (electronic, 
mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written 
permission. Enquiries should be addressed to the publishers.
Notwithstanding the above, Educational Institutions (including Schools, Independent Colleges, Universities, and TAFEs) are granted permission to 




Stay informed via the field’s leading think tank, 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
BLOG 
ASPI’s blog, The Strategist, delivers fresh 
ideas on Australia’s defence and strategic 
policy choices as well as encouraging 
discussion and debate among interested 
stakeholders in the online strategy 
community. Visit and subscribe to 
an email digest at www.aspistrategist.
org.au. You can follow on Twitter 
(@ASPI_org) and like us on Facebook 
(www.facebook.com/ASPI.org).
To find out more about ASPI and membership go to www.aspi.org.au
or contact us on 02 6270 5100 and enquiries@aspi.org.au.
  Supported by 
